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POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The Future of Coexistence: U.S.-Soviet Relations 
NICOLAS PROTYNIAK * 
ABSTRACT - Basic trends that may develop in American-Soviet relations in the foreseeable fu-
ture may be analyzed against the background styles of the two countries which constitute a 
model of the main determinants in continuity and change. Such analysis seems to indicate that 
competition rather than cooperation will continue to mark the relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, though with a gradual decrease in hostile intensity. Within a broader 
view, this relationship may offer to the United Stales not only failures and disappointments, but 
also a creative challenge to contribute to world peace and progress if the challenge is realized 
and met without the skeptic tendency and mood of international withdrawal that often typified 
this country's history. 
In analyzing a topic as complex and broad as peaceful 
coexistence between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, it is imperative to set some guidelines or dimen-
sions under which the subject matter is to be treated. It 
is important, also, to isolate some of the more crucial 
variables for additional attention. 
Certain assumptions must be made about peaceful 
coexistence as the basis for further analysis. Within a 
broader frame, the two major assumptions may be viewed 
as a continuity and change in which the United States and 
the Soviet Union maintain their relations. The two as-
sumptions provide, in addition, some broader questions 
regarding the extent as well as the limits within which 
politics of international relations in general and Ameri-
can-Soviet relations in particular operate. 
The extreme difficulty of analyzing American-Soviet 
relations within the broad concept of continuity and 
change is readily apparent when Soviet foreign relations 
are examined within the more basic problems of internal 
politics and the traditional Russian patterns inherited 
from the tsarist regime. This difficulty is compounded, 
also, by the unavailability of some crucial source ma-
terials. 
Yet much preliminary work on the question of conti-
nuity and change has been done by historians and social 
scientists, especially since World War II. The prevailing 
evidence seems to indicate that both the traditional Rus-
sian and the newer Marxist elements are present in the 
Soviet political system (Hendel, 1959). Both Marxist 
and tsarist Russians were expansive in action and out-
look; both tended to be extreme and radical; both were 
overly assertive and dogmatic; both possessed messianic 
and mystical ideologies; and both considered their ideol-
ogies superior to all other ideologies (Lederer, 1962). 
These common elements of Communism and Russian 
autocracy are largely due to the fact that both operated 
under similar conditions. It may explain why the Rus-
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sians were always very difficult to deal with and the 
Communists are even more so ( Kennan, 1961 ) . 
Contrast of Systems 
In relation to the Soviet Union, the United States 
stands at the opposite end of the political continuum. 
United States political institutions and ideas have evolved 
mainly from the 18th century liberalism and within the 
unique conditions of the American continent. Social and 
p~liti~al institutions have grown from the ground up, cul-
mmatmg finally in the federal system. Such a develop-
ment has clearly favored individual initiative endurance 
self-reliance, and the ability to meet variou~ challenge~ 
and change. Both traditional authoritarianism and mod-
ern totalitarianism are foreign to the American political 
system as well as to its liberal and businessman-like tra-
dition. Though gradually, under the modern media of 
~ommunication and economic as well as technological 
mterdep~nde_nce the gap of contrast is being narrowed, 
the crucial differences between the United States and the 
Soviet Union are still decisive factors in their relations. 
The Communist Terminology 
A major obstacle to understanding Soviet policy is the 
problem of establishing a true meaning in the Commu-
nist terminology. Like so many terms in Soviet poUtics 
h h " ' t e p rase peaceful coexistence" does not imply the 
same meaning as its western counterpart. In a sense, 
peaceful coexistence is a misnomer, its basic elements 
~eemin~ to connote rather the opposite: political rivalry, 
1deolog1cal struggle, class struggle, underground activity, 
e_conomic, techno!ogical, social, and scientific competi-
t10n, struggle agamst western imperialism and colonial-
ism, internal and external promotion of Communism 
promotion of "wars of liberation," and so on. Coexist~ 
ence, therefore, does not mean a reconciliation (Spanier, 
I 967) between the socialist and capitalist camps. Hence, 
the Soviet idea of peaceful coexistence may be para-
phrased as a continuation of war by other means. 
The ~ew ~olicy, like the previous one, is a strategy 
and tactic designed to enable Communism to prevail over 
capitalism and other systems. Thus, in actual fact the 
conc~pt of peaceful coexistence cannot be regarded as a 
genume proposal for peace and is, perhaps, no more gen-
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uine than the decision of the ancient Greeks to abandon 
the siege of Troy by a shrewd temporary retreat. 
There is, however, one genuine element in the pro-
posal for peaceful coexistence,· namely, the Soviet desire 
to refrain from nuclear and major conventional wars, a 
decrease in political tension between Europe and the 
United States, and the pursuit of less violent, less overt 
but more subtle piecemeal expansion. 
The only significant change in the new Soviet doctrine 
is the abandonment of the idea that war between the 
Communist and capitalist camps is inevitable. The Chin-
ese Communists have not given up this ideological dog-
ma, and this is one reason for Sino-Soviet discord. The 
Soviets have abandoned war as a means for the achieve-
ment of Communism because they realize, as do people 
elsewhere, that in a modern nuclear war, which would 
harm both sides, the Communists would seem to lose 
more since their cause was destined to prevail, and the 
capitalists would lose less since their cause was already 
doomed. 
In the new communist concept of peaceful coexistence, 
the element of competition is strongly stressed. In 1959, 
Khrushchev told Nixon in Moscow: 
Sportsmen have a fine tradition; winners are warmly 
greeted and congratulated. Why should not coun-
tries engaged in peaceful competition maintain such 
a tradition? We will derive profound satisfaction 
when we surpass in peaceful competition such a fine 
industrial "runner" as the United States, the most 
advanced capitalist country (Dept. of State, l 959). 
At the June, 1963, Central Committee plenary meeting, 
Khrushchev gave this peaceful competition a more elo-
quent and Darwinist expression a la American style, say-
ing: 
The capitalists know the cruel law of competition: 
if one outstrips another, the stronger one swallows 
the weaker one. The competition of the two systems 
in the economic field strikes even greater fear into 
the hearts of imperialists. They see that the rapid 
growth of socialism is increasingly shaking the foun-
dations of capitalism, bringing the end of this sys-
tem, which is doomed by history (Barnett, 1965). 
Peaceful coexistence, consequently, is only a partial 
peace (Ramundo, 1967), and a relatively small part 
may be safely considered as such. This was also indi-
cated by the next Communist Party leader, Leonid 
Brezhnev, at the 1966 Party Congress. He stated that 
"there can be no peaceful coexistence where matters 
concern the internal process of the class and national lib-
eration struggle in the capitalist countries or in colonies. 
Peaceful coexistence is not applicable to the relations 
between oppressors and oppressed, between colonialists 
and the victims of colonial oppression" (Shulman, 
1967). The new Communist leadership has not altered 
the basic tenets of the coexistence policy which were 
formulated under Khrushchev. The change, if any, is 
rather noticeable in a more cautious and conservative 
application of these principles of peaceful coexistence 
(Brezhnev, 1966). 
Whatever the changes in the Soviet leadership, one 
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thing remains constant : the challenge to the United 
States and its allies in many fields of political and non-
political contest. This being the case, the United States 
has essentiaUy two alternatives in dealing with the Soviet 
Union : either to withdraw from this competitive struggle 
to a new position of drifting isolationism or accept the 
Soviet challenge and match it with a counter-challenge 
within the frame of its tradition. In either case, whatever 
America decides will affect not only the two great com-
peting powers but also the rest of the world. 
The grave American responsibility in this challenge 
is also indicative of the difficulties which the United 
States leadership is to face . The question is essentially 
one of able leadership which would be equal to the task. 
Again, whatever course this country takes, the dilemma 
before the American leadership is how to maintain peace 
and stability as well as how to provide for necessary and 
orderly change in a potentially explosive and revolu-
tionary age. 
Path of Least Resistance 
Perhaps, no one would more welcome the American 
withdrawal from this global contest than the Soviet Union 
itself, for that would remove the only serious obstacle 
in the Soviet path toward realization of its communist 
objectives. Although the Communists are not willing to 
risk a war, "they will take advantage of any opening in 
any part of the world to expand the influence of Com-
munism" (Harriman, 1967). And though the present 
Soviet leadership may be more cautious and less aggres-
sive, it still would be tempted to fill in any possible 
vacuum, especially in places where it could easily move 
along the path of least resistance. 
Since only the United States is capable of meeting the 
Soviet challenge, a unilateral withdrawal would entail 
grave consequences to the present status quo in Europe 
and other parts of the globe. Thus, a unilateral with-
drawal poses a serious question: what would the Com-
munists do in their counter-move? It is not too difficult 
to imagine why the people in America and elsewhere 
would not be willing to submit to the risks of such ex-
perimentation. Moreover, for those who make history, 
there is also historical responsibility; and no major 
power can abdicate its responsibility without being sub-
ject to the verdict of history. Certainly, a sense of his-
torical responsibility is also necessary if those who make 
history are to be publicly responsible. Recent history of 
withdrawals and appeasements to totalitarian-move-
ments-regimes offers instructive comments regarding pos-
sible consequences of such policies. Careful considera-
tions, therefore, seem to suggest that a U.S. withdrawal 
in the face of the Soviet challenge cannot be an accept-
able policy or a solution to the problem. 
This leaves the United States only the second option: 
to accept the Soviet challenge with maturity and deter-
mination and to meet it on Soviet terms. Certainly, a 
free and developed society should be capable of meet~ 
ing a challenge from its less-developed totalitarian com-
petitor. The United States is able to meet the Soviet 
proposal for economic competition, disarmament and 
arms control, ideological contest and free exchange of 
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ideas, exchange of scientific and cultural data as well as 
personnel, economic and technical assistance to the de-
veloping countries, furthering the cause of national liber-
ation and freedom for all subjugated peopks, promotion 
of universal human rights and freedom throughout the 
world, promotion of peace through the channels of in-
ternational organization, and other such projects of mu-
tual interest. 
But whatever the competition or cooperation, the 
United States should make one thing unequivocally clear 
to the Russians: all actions and projects must be recip-
rocal in their character, and concessions made by one 
power must be followed by similar concessions from 
another. It should also be made clear to all concerned, 
however, that concessions made by one side without a 
reciprocal action on the part of another cannot bring 
desired results. And one thing that could considerably 
mitigate some of the harsher features of totalitarianism 
both at home and abroad is the application and system-
atic pursuance of the idea of reciprocity by a demo-
cratic power in its relations with non-democratic powers. 
Moreover, the idea of reciprocity could open new fields 
for its application as well as a great opportunity for the 
American leadership to work peacefully toward improve-
ments and reforms on the world scene. This success is 
postulated on the assumption that the policy based on 
reciprocity and equality, coupled with wisdom and dig-
nity, is more attractive and efficacious than the Soviet 
counterpart (Mosely, 1956). 
Above all, projects of mutual interests in the Soviet-
American competition and cooperation must be suffi-
ciently defined and clarified, or set aside until conditions 
are ripe for such clarification. In this dangerous nuclear 
age, truth and candor must play a far greater role in in-
ternational relations than ever before. Bluffing, evasion, 
misrepresentation, and other such traditional political de-
vices are not only less applicable but more risky in this 
context. But a business-like and down-to-earth attitude 
in dealing with the Soviets poses some difficulties, for 
the Russian mind is less inclined than the American mind 
to tread the precise, legalistic, and empirical path in 
foreign as well as internal affairs. On the other hand, the 
American mind is less favorably disposed to the Soviet 
penchant for generalities, inflated and universalized prop-
aganda statements (Goodman, 1960), vague and ambi-
tious pronouncements, inclination to secrecy and conspir-
ative tactic ( Barnett, 1965), cunning as well as duplic-
ity (Hoover, 1958), and other such forms of the Ren-
aissance type of diplomacy. 
Moreover, the elimination of less desirable character-
istics of diplomacy and clarification of possible doubts 
concerning such grave questions as nuclear miscalcula-
tion and misunderstanding would further improve the So~ 
viet-American relations. Furthermore, the Soviet concept 
of peaceful coexistence, if it is to be at all meaningful, 
would have to be further specified, particularly in cases 
of foreign intervention by major powers. How much as-
sistance, for instance, can a major power lend in a local 
war before such a war is classed as intervention or ag-
gression? Another important problem of peaceful co-
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existence is the question of escalation in local conflicts. 
At what point, for example, would a local conflict be 
considered general and, thus, outside the scope of the 
"peaceful competition?" 
A Guide to Strategy 
The Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence does not 
provide any answers to such crucial questions, nor does 
it constitute any real basis for the assessment and evalu-
ation of the Soviet behavior in international affairs. The 
policy seems to serve the Soviet Union rather as a guide 
in international strategy and tactic as well as the Soviet 
condition for peaceful competition to which the United 
States and other western countries have been challenged. 
Moreover, through this concept of peaceful coexistence 
the Soviets project a new image of the Soviet Union as 
a major progressive power striving for peace and social 
change (Lederer, 1962). In other respects, however, the 
concept of peaceful coexistence is perhaps no less nebu-
lous than the old Russian idea of "Holy Alliance" which 
was introduced at the Congress of Vienna after the de-
feat of Napolean in 1815. The fact that the Soviets have 
failed to develop their concept into a useful method of 
conflict-resolution or cooperation indicates that they pre-
fer the vogue of ritualistic and propaganda phraseology 
to a workable policy. 
Though the ideology and diplomacy may encourage 
the Soviets to engage in international aggrandizement, 
the compelling factor which tends to dampen their ap-
petites is far more fundamental. The first and foremost 
element which dictates a cautious Soviet course in for-
eign affairs is the danger of nuclear war. This real need 
to coexist stems from the awesome destructive capability 
and the realization that a general nuclear war would 
spare neither the victors nor the vanquished. The real 
desire to coexist, consequently, is ultimately the very 
threat of human survival. The instinct seems to suggest, 
as Professor Toynbee once observed, that men, along 
with ants, have a vested interest in survival. Thus, the 
stalemate emphasizes that there is in fact no alternative 
and that it is better to coexist than not to exist. The 
people in the Communist orbit - China excepted - arc 
no less aware of this danger than the people in the West. 
Hence, it is the realization of the common danger of ex-
termination which provides the most compelling and im-
portant reason in the desire to avoid such devastating 
wars. 
This danger of nuclear holocaust, together with the 
fact that the nuclear destructive forces cannot be elimi-
nated, presents the leadership of the major powers with 
the problem of working out a pattern for peaceful co-
existence along with the nuclear threat Moreover, there 
is no possibility to turn back the clock of history and re-
turn to more serene, peaceful, and non-nuclear times. 
What is at stake is not a question of whether different 
political systems should coexist, but rather whether men 
can live together without destroying each other and all 
that they have accomplished (Osgood, 1962). 
There are some encouraging signs, however, that the 
situation may not necessarily be as hopeless as it seems. 
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One is the gradual transition from bipolarism to poly-
centrism. New centers of power in Asia and Europe are 
beginning to emerge; the old alliances are changing, and 
the tense cold war polarization between the Soviet Union 
and the United States is receding. 
The nuclear proliferation has helped to undermine the 
global polarization of the various states of the two hostile 
blocs - Communist and anti-Communist- and to cause 
other power centers to emerge. This tendency toward 
polycentrism (Lerch, 1967) and power diffusion has fa-
vored the lesser powers, for it offered them a greater 
freedom of initiative not only in their internal politics 
but external as well. At the same time, however, it be-
came in the hands of small states a method with which 
to check and limit the freedom of the major powers in 
their initiative and their choice of action (Osgood, 
1962). This position favorable to the lesser powers was 
further exploited and expanded by the satellites in order 
to free themselves of political dependency. Moreover, the 
great powers have themselves realized the limitations in 
the nuclear as well as conventional armament and arms 
race and the fact that such an increase in military power 
does not necessarily bring the desired political results in 
corresponding measure. Thus, they have come to the 
awareness that the nuclear stalemate may reach a point 
of diminished returns. 
Politically and militarily, the United States must ad-
just to this stage of transition which Leon Trotsky once 
characterized as "neither peace nor war." The U.S. 
should not then anticipate speedy resolution in the East-
West rivalry. 
The Soviet propaganda offensive is far less dangerous 
and may be met with less efforts or exertion than other 
contests. A free society is better equipped to face a to-
talitarian ideology than any other and should not fear 
losing a war of words to Communists. The Communist 
ideology is, therefore, not too dangerous if presented for 
what it is: a totalitarian means of rationalization and 
justification of one-party rule, buttressed by force and 
cunning in the pursuit of its goals. 
Economic Competition 
Of greater importance and interest in this contest be-
tween Communism and capitalism is the question of eco-
nomic development and competition. In this contest the 
United States and other western countries have a con-
siderable advantage over the Soviet Union and its satel-
lites: they are more advanced technologically and pos-
sess greater industrial potential as well as productive ca-
pacity. As such, they are able to exercise a considerable 
attraction for the Communist countries, and in all like-
lihood will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. 
Not only are the Soviet European satellites entertaining 
a growing interest in the West (Brzezinski, 1968), es-
pecially the Common Market countries, but the Soviet 
Union, itself, also is often compelled to turn to the West-
ern countries for things unavailable in the Communist 
bloc. 
Of no minor importance in the context of national 
and international politics are the dynamic forces of na-
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tiona!ism. The strong feeling of group and national 
identity as well as the collective pride in historical tri-
umphs and accomplishments will continue to provide 
political dynamics for international relations in times to 
come. 
Moral and material support of selected nationalist 
movements by the United States can further help to re-
duce the Communist threat and improve Soviet-Ameri-
can relations. Gradual and peaceful transition from a to-
talitarian to a non-totalitarian system of government in 
countries under the Soviet influence will perhaps be more 
weighty and decisive in East-West relations than any 
formal diplomatic proposal for cooperation or coex-
istence between the two large powers. 
Despite the numerous favorable indications, there are 
real problems along the path of peaceful change for the 
United States. The world is full of economic, ideological, 
and nationalist rivalries and many actual and potential 
trouble spots. Moreover, many of the nation-states are 
simply neither strong enough nor economically viable to 
be able to provide for their own national defense and 
prosperity. This fact suggests a rather strong need for 
mutual cooperation between the states in their common 
endeavors. The United States can play a leading role in 
helping this development. 
Other Pressures on U.S. 
The possibility of peaceful reform offers America a 
serious challenge in which it can play a dominant role 
in this general enterprise of promoting peace, freedom, 
and well-being. At the same time, however, the United 
States will continue to face serious difficulties in foreign 
affairs: Communist expansion and wars of "national lib-
eration," tribal and sectional conflicts, and nationalist 
struggles will continue to tax American resources and 
imagination. And no single, universal, or all-purpose 
panacea can provide answers to these diverse and com-
plex problems. The only certain course for the United 
States to follow is to be resolute, firm, reasonable, and 
imaginative. Imperialist designs, conquests, or piecemeal 
penetration and expansion must be met collectively as 
well as contained. Communist expansion and probing 
must be frustrated and proven futile if the Communists 
are to be discouraged in their designs. A successful 
American foreign policy should enable the threatened 
countries, with some American support, to do most of 
their defense work by themselves. 
The role of American leadership is great and chal-
lenging but not at all an impossible task. The modern 
political trends and conditions show some promising in-
dications. When one considers politics as a line of con-
tinuum, with a free government system on the one side 
and a totalitarian one on the other, it is evident that es-
sentially there are but these two political systems with 
some shades between them. Clearly, it is a political 
anomaly to expect about half of humanity to live under 
one or another totalitarian system. 
Given a chance, the only way the mass of humanity 
can move is toward a more liberal and democratic order. 
Dynamic forces to achieve this are already under way, 
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and these forces are bound to affect not only the coun-
tries involved but also the major powers. Moreover, the 
movement will create a greater interdependence among 
states as well as a greater need for international coopera-
tion either through bilateral or multilateral arrangements. 
Within this continuity and change, the question of the 
future of American-Soviet relations may vary consider-
ably, but under a wise policy, need not be too gloomy. 
A competitive rather than peaceful coexistence will prob-
ably continue with a tough, though somewhat modified, 
Russian partner. With time and successive changes in 
leadership, the Soviet Union will be moving further and 
further away from its fanatical and totalitarian founders. 
Before such a change can come to full fruition, how-
ever, the United States must be able to weather the storm 
and steer its course through more dangerous and chal-
lenging times in a period of transition and upheaval. 
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Learned Societies Around the World 
Eastern and Central Europe 
Scientific academies similar to those in the Western world existed in all 
Eastern and central European countries before the war. A far-reaching reorgani-
zation of these academies took place about 13 years ago. The statutes of the 
new academies were patterned upon those of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The 
academies were given the status of the "supreme scientific authority" in the 
countries concerned. They were made responsible for controlling and coordinating 
all scientific research in accordance with the requirements of the annual economic 
plans. These new functions resulted in a considerable increase in the number of 
institutions and in the personnel employed. 
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